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ABSTRACT

The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has a host of tools to punish
insider trading and other fraudulent investing activity. One of its most
powerful weapons is the disgorgement of profits. In federal court, the SEC
frequently seeks the disgorgement of ill-gotten profits by criminal
defendants. However, disgorgement is an imprecise instrument. In the
high-speed world of institutional investing, it can be incredibly difficult for
the SEC to prove exactly which profits were ill-gotten and which were not.
† J.D. Candidate, 2018, Liberty University School of Law. I am incredibly thankful for the
support of my wife and family, as well as the dedication of the entire Law Review staff who made
this Note possible.
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The difficulty arises because it is nearly impossible to prove with precision
what gains were due to the ill-advised tip from an insider and what gains
were due to the benign swings of the stock market.
Given the difficulty, courts have found that precision is too high a bar. In
SEC v. First City Financial Corp., a watershed 1989 case, the D.C. Circuit
held that, given the inherent difficulty in proving causation with precision,
the SEC only had to provide a “reasonable approximation” of ill-gotten
gain. Essentially, once the SEC provided a ballpark estimate of the
defendants’ gain, the onus was on the defendants to prove that
approximation was wrong. This burden-shifting framework quickly spread
to the other circuits, with varying applications.
The framework set out by the D.C. Circuit shifted the burden of proving
precisely the amount to be disgorged, but it did not shift the burden of
proving causation. This imbalance has created a contradiction in the law
because the prosecution’s burden of proving proximate causation runs
directly counter to the reasonable approximation rule of First Financial
Corp. In proving damages, the burden-shifting framework only requires the
SEC to prove a “reasonable approximation” of ill-gotten gains; however, in
proving proximate cause, the SEC must prove with exactitude the profits
that flowed from the wrong committed. The classic First Financial Corp.
framework would allow the SEC to provide a reasonable approximation of
profits for one element of the crime, but be forced to specifically prove
damages in the other. Thus, if the SEC were required to prove that the
profits received by defendants were proximately caused by their misdeeds, it
would completely undermine the burden-shifting framework of First
Financial Corp.
The Third Circuit solved this dilemma in SEC v. Teo by relaxing the
SEC’s burden to prove causation. In SEC v. Teo, the Third Circuit held that
the SEC does not have the burden of proving proximate cause. Rather, the
SEC must only prove but-for causation between alleged wrongdoing and illgotten profits, which means that it must only prove that the defendant’s
profits would not have occurred, but for his unlawful actions. Once that is
proven, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the rest of his
profits were not proximately connected to his unlawful gains.
The Third Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Teo was correctly decided. By
relaxing the burden of proving causation, the Third Circuit has aligned the
burden of proving causation with the burden of proving ill-gotten profits.
The synergy between the rules requiring only but-for causation and
“reasonable approximation” of ill-gotten profits is too great to be ignored
by the other circuits. The other circuits should join the Third Circuit in
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extending the reasoning of First Financial Corp. to the issue of proximate
causation.
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 10, 2014, in SEC v. Teo, the Third Circuit held that, in an
action for disgorgement of profits under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the SEC does not have the burden of proving that the illegal activity
complained of proximately caused the profits sought to be disgorged.1
Instead, the Third Circuit reasoned that the relevant case law only required
the SEC to prove but-for causation between alleged wrongdoing and illgotten profits. In holding that the SEC needs only to prove but-for
causation in disgorgement cases, the Third Circuit in SEC v. Teo2 primarily
rested on the authority of SEC v. First City Financial Corp., which in turn
relied on SEC v. MacDonald.3 The holding in Teo created a split with the
other circuits, which have all required the SEC to show at least some level of
proximate cause.4 Despite this circuit split, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari when the defendants in Teo appealed.5
This Note argues that the Third Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Teo was
correctly decided.6 After discussing the development of the SEC’s
enforcement powers, Part III of this Note analyzes the formation of the
current causation test created by the D.C. Circuit in SEC v. First City
Financial Corp., and its precedential development in SEC v. Macdonald.
Part IV of this Note discusses the factual and procedural history of SEC v.

1. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 107 (3d. Cir. 2014).
2. SEE TEO, 746 F.3D AT 105-06.
3. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
4. John P. Quinn, A Cause for Concern: The Need for Proximate Cause in SEC Enforcement
Actions and How the Third Circuit Got It Wrong in Sec v. Teo, 56 B.C.L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 138,
140 (2015).
5. Id.
6. See Teo, 746 F.3d at 107 (holding that the investor was unjustly enriched as a result of his
securities violations). Proximate cause can be thought of as a policy question asking how far
liability for a particular action should extend. See Peter Tipps, Note, Controlling the Lead Paint
Debate: Why Control Is Not an Element of Public Nuisance, 50 B.C.L. REV. 605, 628-29
(2009) (discussing the characteristics of proximate cause within the context of public nuisance
liability). Proximate cause examines how far removed an individual’s conduct is from a resulting
harm, and seeks to determine if the harm was a foreseeable consequence of that harm. See id. As
applied to the remedy of disgorgement, proximate cause examines whether or not the defendant’s
profit is directly attributable to the underlying wrong, taking into account causal
attenuation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51 cmt. f (2011) (discussing causation
and remoteness as applied to the elements of disgorgement).
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Teo and analyzes the reasoning employed by the Third Circuit. Finally, Part
V addresses the circuit split created by the decision in Teo and contrasts the
Third Circuit’s correct interpretation of the application of causation in SEC
enforcement actions with that of the conflicting circuits.
II. BACKGROUND
“That most delicious of all privileges—spending other people’s money.”7
The SEC has a host of enforcement powers that it can bring to bear against
a fraudster. In seeking a judicial remedy, the SEC can pursue civil monetary
penalties, an officer or director bar, injunctions, disgorgement, or other
equitable remedies.8 The SEC may also institute an action for civil or
criminal contempt.9 However, one of the SEC’s most powerful weapons is
disgorgement. The SEC frequently seeks disgorgement of profits from
illegal insider trading in federal court.10
A. The SEC’s Equitable Remedy of Disgorgement
The equitable remedy of disgorgement is designed to deprive fraudsters
of ill-gotten gains whereby they have been unjustly enriched.11 The SEC
defines disgorgement as “the repayment of illegally gained profits (or
avoided losses) for distribution to harmed investors whenever feasible.”12
Disgorgement is not primarily intended to compensate victims, but instead

7. John Randolph of Roanoke, http://izquotes.com/quote/349748 (last accessed Nov. 15,
2017).
8. Insider Trading, Third Edition § 7.01 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Manor Nursing
Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505,
528 (D.N.J. 1999); SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
11. Teo, 746 F.3d at 105; see also SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir.
2014) (“Disgorgement is an equitable remedy, imposed to ‘forc[e] a defendant to give up the
amount by which he was unjustly enriched.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting FTC v. Bronson
Partners, 654 F.3d 359, 372 (2d Cir. 2011)).
12. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Agency Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2014, at 66 n.9. (2014),
https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD7S-FRLK].
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to deter future violations of securities law.13 As a deterrent, disgorgement is
highly effective since awards are often punishingly large.14
Disgorgement is a highly effective weapon in the SEC’s litigation arsenal.
The Commission collects considerably more money from disgorgement
remedies than it does in civil penalties. In 2014 (fiscal year) alone, the SEC
recovered $2.788 billion in disgorgement of illegal profit.15 Meanwhile, the
Commission recovered only $1.378 billion in civil penalties in the same
period.16
B. Historical Underpinnings of Disgorgement Power
Courts have broad latitude in granting disgorgement because it is an
equitable remedy, and fashioning equitable remedies is an inherent power
of the court.17 Further, the various securities acts specifically provide the
courts with broad equity powers to fashion remedies in securities fraud
cases.18 However, neither The Dodd Frank, Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, nor the other securities acts, specifically give the
SEC the statutory right to seek disgorgement in federal court.19
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) does, however, specifically provide for
equitable remedies. In Section 305(b), SOX provides that “[i]n any action or
proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision
of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may
grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the

13. SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In a securities enforcement action,
as in other contexts, ‘disgorgement’ is not available primarily to compensate victims. Instead,
disgorgement has been used by the SEC and courts to prevent wrongdoers from unjustly
enriching themselves through violations, which has the effect of deterring subsequent fraud.”).
14. See, e.g., Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Facade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 2-3, n.12 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Ryan__TheEquity-Fa%C3%A7ade-of-SEC-Disgorgement.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG3D-6PD5] (“In practice . .
. the SEC rarely uses administrative proceedings to pursue contested disgorgement claims,
preferring instead to file and litigate such claims in federal court.”).
15. These figures include both orders from SEC cease-and-desist proceedings, as well as
enforcement actions in federal court. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Select SEC and Market Data:
Fiscal 2014, at 2 tbl.1 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2014.pdf[https://perma.cc/UQ6GZ2Z4].
16. Id.
17. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d at 118.
18. See supra notes 19-24 and the accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Manor Nursing
Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505,
528 (D.N.J. 1999); SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
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benefit of investors.”20 Furthermore, SOX recognizes (and may implicitly
endorse) the SEC’s right to seek disgorgement in Section 308(a):
If in any judicial or administrative action brought by the
Commission under the securities laws . . . the Commission
obtains an order [or settlement] requiring disgorgement against
any person and the Commission also obtains . . . a civil penalty
against the same person, the amount of the penalty shall, on the
motion or at the direction of the Commission, be added to and
become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit of the
victims of such violation.21
Similarly, Dodd Frank allows the SEC to “enter an order requiring
accounting and disgorgement” in any proceeding in which the SEC can
impose a civil penalty,22 but disgorgement is not defined anywhere in that
statute.23
Accordingly, courts have assumed that disgorgement is
contiguous with the equitable remedies imposed by federal judges before
Dodd Frank was passed.24
The courts do not rely exclusively on Dodd Frank or the other securities
acts for authority to grant disgorgement. Even before Dodd Frank was
enacted, the SEC routinely obtained disgorgement of gains derived from
illegal insider trading in federal courts.25 The SEC persuaded courts to grant

20. Pub. L. 107–204, § 305(b), adding Section 21(d)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5).
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308(a), 116 Stat. 745, 784-85
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(e).
23. The SEC does not have statutory authority to seek disgorgement in federal court. Instead,
it has asserted and courts have held that it has this authority as an equitable extension of its
broader authority to enforce the securities laws. See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d
1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing disgorgement as an equitable power and noting it may not
be used punitively).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 442 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It is well settled that § 21(d)
permits the SEC to obtain more than injunctive relief.”); id. at 453 (“The SEC’s power to obtain
injunctive relief has been broadly read to include disgorgement of profits realized from violations
of the securities laws.”); SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (“Disgorgement, then, is available simply because the relevant provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, sections 21(d) and (e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d) and (e), vest jurisdiction in the
federal courts.”); SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014
(1988); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978). For a lengthy discussion of disgorgement and
the SEC’s authority to seek it, see SEC v. Aragon Capital Mgmt., LLC, 672 F. Supp. 2d 421, 437–46
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (insider trading case).
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disgorgement pursuant to the court’s equity jurisdiction in a great number
of cases.26 In fact, as early as 1971, the Second Circuit held in the landmark
case SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. that “[i]t would severely defeat the
purposes of the [1934 Act] if a violator of Rule 10b-5 were allowed to retain
the profits from his violation.”27
According to the Second Circuit in SEC v. Cavanagh, federal courts have
the power to award disgorgement pursuant to their equity jurisdiction
independent of statutory grant of authority.28 The Second Circuit showed
that the test—originally set out by the Supreme Court in Grupo Mexicano
de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.—for equitable jurisdiction is
whether the remedy sought was available at chancery in 1789.29 Given that
the term “disgorgement” was unlikely used in 1789, the Second Circuit
analyzed the question functionally. The Court investigated whether
defendants in 1789 were allowed to keep ill-gotten gains from their
misdeeds.30 It found that eighteenth-century English chancellors ordered
remedies that were functionally identical to the SEC’s disgorgement
remedy.31 Thus, disgorgement was available at chancery, and thereby within
the equitable jurisdiction of the court.32
C. Application of the Disgorgement Remedy
The SEC’s disgorgement powers are far-reaching and incredibly effective.
The Commission routinely employs disgorgement against insider traders.
Not only has the SEC forced disgorgement from tippees, but it has also
obtained disgorgement from tippers.33 In some cases, the SEC has required
26. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Manor Nursing
Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505,
528 (D.N.J. 1999); SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
27. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971).
28. SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 118 (2d Cir. 2006).
29. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318-19
(1999).
30. Id. (“[O]ur inquiry concerns not the name used by equity courts and commentators for
historical remedies but rather their specific actions and the resulting practical consequences.”).
31. Id. at 118-20.
32. In finding disgorgement available at common law, the Court in Cavanagh relied on two
cases from England and two from colonial America. Id. at 118-20.
33. See, e.g., SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48–50 (2d Cir. 1998); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453
(9th Cir. 1990); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1005 (1971); SEC v. Michel, 521 F. Supp. 2d 795, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (ordering stockbroker insider
trading defendant to disgorge his own profits, the profits of his tippees, and the commissions
earned on his client/tippees’ trades).
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tippers to disgorge profits earned by tippees—even if the tippees complied
with federal securities law.34 In SEC v. Antar, the court ordered innocent
investors, who did not cooperate in the fraud, to disgorge their profits.35 In
that case, a defendant sold stock in an initial public offering (IPO) while in
possession of material nonpublic adverse information.36 Accordingly, he
was convicted of insider trading. The SEC did not allege that the other
innocent investors who participated in the offering were even aware of the
fraud.37 Despite their nonparticipation and lack of knowledge, the court
found that the innocent investors were unjustly enriched.38 Thus, the court
ordered disgorgement of their profits.39
Similar to the decision in SEC v. Antar, the federal district court for the
Southern District of Florida in SEC v. Chemical Trust40 found that innocent
parties could be required to disgorge ill-gotten gains. The court in that case
held that “[i]t is not necessary for the person holding the property to have
done anything wrong in order for that person to be required to return the
property to its rightful owner.”41 The court proceeded to order the
defendant to disgorge the gross profits it received from the illegal scheme,
even though the defendant was not the party that had defrauded the
investors.42
Not only can the SEC require innocent parties to disgorge profits, the
SEC can also require more profits to be disgorged than the insider trader
actually received. In SEC v. Shapiro, the Second Circuit found that the
proper measure of disgorgement was not actual profits, but rather the
“paper profits” resulting after dissemination and absorption of the
information, even where such profits exceed actual profits.43 The court
reasoned accordingly:
A violator of the securities laws should disgorge profits earned by
trading on non-public information. Once public disclosure is
34. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 454 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that requiring a tipper to
disgorge his tippee’s profits “is a necessary deterrent to evasion of Rule 10b-5 liability by either . . .
enriching a friend or relative . . . or . . . tipping others with the expectation of reciprocity”).
35. SEC v. Antar, 15 F. Supp. 2d 477, 532–33 (D.N.J. 1998).
36. Id. at 533.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. SEC v. Chem. Trust, No. 00-8015-CIV, 2000 WL 33231600 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2000).
41. Id. at *11.
42. Id. at *12-13.
43. SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974).
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made and all investors are trading on an equal footing, the
violator should take the risks of the market himself. Moreover, a
contrary holding would create a serious anomaly that might
encourage insider trading. To require disgorgement only of
actual profits in cases where the price of the stock subsequently
fell would create a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose opportunity for the
violator: he could keep subsequent profits but not suffer
subsequent losses.44
Given that the SEC can order a defendant to disgorge mere “paper
profits,” it was only a short extension for federal courts to hold that the SEC
need not prove with exactness the amount required to be disgorged. The
D.C. Circuit held in SEC v. First City Financial Corp. that “disgorgement
need only be a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to
the violation.”45 In discussing First City Financial Corp., the Second Circuit
reasoned in SEC v. Patel that when the disgorgement measure cannot be
exact, “any ‘risk of uncertainty . . . should fall on the wrongdoer whose
illegal conduct created that uncertainty.’”46
One court has gone so far as to hold that a brokerage firm must disgorge
profits from illegal insider trading by its customers.47 In SEC v. Stephenson,
the customers asked their broker to reverse some illegal transactions.48
Instead of informing the customers that such a reversal was impossible, the
firm pocketed the funds.49 The court held that the brokerage company must
disgorge the profits because they were unjustly gained as a result of the
fraud.50 In another case, The Seventh Circuit suggested in dicta that a court
might be able to order disgorgement of insider trading profits received as a
nominee of the primary defendant, provided that the nominee had no
ownership interest in the proceeds.51
As shown above, the court’s power to order disgorgement is founded on
firm statutory and precedential authority. The SEC has forced an eclectic
mix of defendants to disgorge profits in a variety of cases. Given this broad
44. Id. See CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1993) (proper measure of
disgorgement is amount of ill-gotten gains received by defendant, not amount of investor losses).
45. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
46. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at
1232).
47. SEC v. Stephenson, 720 F. Supp. 370, 327-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
48. Id. at 371.
49. Id. at 371-73.
50. Id. at 373.
51. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).
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equitable power, it is not unjust for federal courts to require the SEC to
prove only but-for cause when seeking disgorgement of ill-gotten gains
rather than requiring the SEC to prove both but-for cause and proximate
cause.52 The federal courts have the power to require innocent individuals
to disgorge ill-gotten profits; it is not a heavier burden to require culpable
defendants to disgorge profits without the showing of proximate cause.
III. BURDEN-SHIFTING FRAMEWORK
The SEC employs a variety of remedies to punish insider traders and
other violators of federal securities law. One of its most powerful remedies
is the equitable remedy of disgorgement of profits. The SEC uses this
remedy to prevent the unjust enrichment of defendants. Unfortunately, illgotten gains are extremely difficult to measure. For example, suppose that a
stockholder purchases stock on insider information and then holds on to it
for ten years. At the end of the decade, he sells the stock and uses the money
to purchase a different stock in a completely legal manner. How much
profit should he be required to disgorge? Should he be forced to disgorge
the appreciation directly following the first purchase, or should he be
required to return the full appreciation realized in the ten years he held the
stock? What about the subsequent purchase? Should any profit from the
second stock be disgorged simply because he bought it with money gained
from insider trading? But for the insider trading, he would not have had the
money to purchase the second stock; however, is his profit from the second
stock proximately caused by his illegal insider trading activity?
The courts recognize that illegal gains are difficult to measure and even
more difficult to trace to their source. Rather than allow this difficulty to
favor defendants, the D.C. Circuit in SEC v. First Financial Corp.53 shifted
the burden of proving damages with certainty to the defendant. By
universally adopting the D.C. Circuit’s burden-shifting framework, the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals have already greatly lowered the prosecutor’s
burden of proof.

52. But-for cause is a hypothetical construct that asks whether or not a given event would
have occurred in the same manner even if a particular factor were removed. See Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (discussing the meaning of but-for cause). A particular factor
is considered an actual cause of an event if that event would not have occurred absent the
factor. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b (2005) (discussing but-for cause in tort
law). The but-for test seeks to determine if a particular factor was a necessary condition for an
outcome, but not necessarily that it was the exclusive cause. See id. § 26 cmts. b, c.
53. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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A. SEC v. First City Financial Corp., 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
In SEC v. First City Financial Corp., the D.C. Circuit first enacted a
burden-shifting framework to prove causation in insider trading cases. In
that case, the SEC charged Marc Belzberg and his company, First City
Financial Corporation, Ltd. (“First City”), with the deliberate evasion of
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d),54
and its accompanying regulations. Section 13(d)55 requires any person who
has directly or indirectly obtained the beneficial ownership of more than
five percent of any registered equity security to disclose the ownership (and
other information) of such stock to the SEC within ten days.56 In this case,
the SEC alleged that the defendant deliberately filed his required disclosures
after the mandated ten-day period in order to facilitate his attempted hostile
takeover of Ashland Oil Company (“Ashland”).
The defendant corporation, First City, was a Canadian company,
founded and controlled by the Belzberg family, that specialized in investing
in publically traded American corporations.57 Marc Belzberg managed the
firm’s New York City subsidiary, which was tasked with evaluating
investment opportunities for the parent company.58 The sordid affair that
sparked the litigation in First City Financial Corp. started with a letter on
February 3, 1986 from a New York stockbroker to Belzberg’s father.59 The
letter described Ashland as a “sensational business opportunity” that First
City should consider.60
Belzberg conducted a preliminary analysis of Ashland with his team,
which proved to be favorable.61 Consequently, First City purchased 61,000

54. Id. at 1217.
55. Id.
56. Section 13(d) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership
of any equity security . . . is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition or
within such shorter time as the Commission may establish by rule, file with the
Commission, a statement containing . . . the following information, and such
additional information, as the Commission may . . . prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1).
57. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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shares of Ashland on February 11, 1986.62 Throughout the next month, First
City accumulated large blocks of Ashland shares. By February 26th, First
City owned more than 1.3 million shares of Ashland.63 This stock buildup
left First City holding 4.8 percent of Ashland’s total outstanding stock, not
coincidently riding just below the percentage that triggers mandatory
reporting requirements.64
On March 4th, Marc Belzberg called Alan Greenberg, who worked at a
brokerage company known as Bear Sterns, about buying more Ashland
stock.65 The meaning of that call became the flashpoint of the litigation with
the SEC.66 Greenberg explained in his deposition that he thought the call
was a command by Belzberg to buy Ashland stock on behalf of First City.67
Contrarily, Belzberg later claimed that he only intended the statement to
simply be a recommendation that Greenberg buy the stock himself on
behalf of Bear Stearns.68 Regardless, Greenberg immediately purchased
20,500 shares of Ashland stock.69 If Greenberg purchased the shares on
behalf of First City, (as he contended) it pushed First City over five percent
ownership of Ashland, thus triggering mandatory disclosure of First City’s
ownership stake; however, if the shares were not purchased for First City,
then First City had no duty to disclose its stock holdings to the SEC or the
public.70
Shortly thereafter, First City purchased the shares Greenberg had
accumulated. Once accomplished, Belzberg’s father informed Ashland of
First City’s stake in the company and proposed a friendly takeover.71
Ashland rejected the offer and issued a press release stating that First City

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1).
SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id. at 1218-19. Greenberg testified that:
[Marc Belzberg] called me and said something to the effect that – something
like, “It wouldn’t be a bad idea if you bought Ashland Oil here,” or something
like that. And I took that to mean that we were going to do another put and call
arrangement that we had done in the past. . . . I was absolutely under the
impression I was buying at their risk and I was going to do a put and call.

Id.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1219.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1220.
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owned between eight and nine percent of its stock.72 On March 26th, First
City finally filed the Schedule 13D disclosure.73 On March 31st, Ashland
agreed to buy back First City’s shares for $51 per share, resulting in a $15.4
million profit for First City.74
When the SEC found out about the sale, it initiated an informal
investigation into the timeliness of the 13D disclosure.75 After deposing
Belzberg and Greenberg, the SEC filed suit against Belzberg and First City,
alleging that they crossed the five percent threshold on March 4th, but did
not file the required disclosure statement until March 26th, twelve days
after the section 13(d) deadline.76
The district court found that First City and Marc Belzberg entered into
an informal put and call agreement on March 4th, and then deliberately
violated the ten-day filing requirement of Section 13(d).77 The district court
permanently enjoined the defendants from future violations of Section
13(d) and ordered First City and Belzberg to disgorge the approximately
$2.7 million representing their profits on the 890,000 shares of Ashland
stock acquired between March 14th and 25th.78 The district court reasoned
that the defendants were able to purchase the shares at artificially low prices
because of the defendants’ failure to make the Section 13(d) disclosure on
March 14th.79 The defendants appealed the injunction and disgorgement
remedies as an abuse of discretion.80
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that federal courts have the power to
order disgorgement for insider trading violations.81 The D.C. Circuit
reasoned that the court’s authority to order disgorgement did not arise from
the statute, which does not explicitly authorize a monetary remedy, but
rather from the courts’ inherent equity power.82 In fact, the D.C. Circuit
noted that disgorgement is routinely ordered in insider trading cases,
despite a lack of express authorization under securities law.83
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id. at 1230.
Id.
Id.
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Turning to the question of measuring the profits to be disgorged, the
D.C. Circuit found that the $2.7 million figure delineated by the district
court below was proper.84 The district court had arrived at this number by
simply calculating all of the profits First City realized on the sale of the
890,000 shares it purchased between March 14th (the date it was required to
make a 13(d) disclosure) until March 28th (the date it actually did so).85 In
calculating this disgorgement number, the district court relied on the
assumption that if First City had made the disclosure when it was required,
then the stock purchased after that date would have been much more
expensive.86
In finding the district court’s calculation to be proper, the D.C. Circuit
held that “the court may exercise its equitable power only over property
causally related to the wrongdoing.”87 Disgorgement may not be used
punitively.88 Thus, in order to obtain disgorgement of profits, the SEC must
distinguish between legally and illegally obtained profits.89
At trial, the defendants vigorously disputed the $2.7 million figure,
arguing that it was simplistic and did not take account of all the variables.90
However, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that it would be impossible to precisely
measure the amount of ill-gotten gain.91 Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that
“disgorgement need only be a reasonable approximation of profits causally
connected to the violation.”92 The D.C. Circuit established a burdenshifting framework to prove causation wherein the SEC has the burden to
prove (1) the defendants acted improperly, and (2) a reasonable
approximation of the actual ill-gotten profits. Once the SEC establishes
these two items, the burden shifts to the defendants to rebut the SEC’s
showing of actual profits.93
At first blush, the rule from First City Financial Corp. seems like a very
harsh rule. However, before one can judge the equity of the rule, one must

84. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
85. Id. at 1230.
86. Id. at 1230-31. The court reasoned that had First City properly disclosed the “market
would have been affected by the disclosure that the Belzbergs had taken a greater than 5 percent
stake in Ashland and would soon propose a tender offer.”Id. at 1231.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1232.
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consider the prosecutorial backdrop to the rule. Insider trading94 is a
pervasive problem in our financial system. According to its website, the SEC
prosecutes between 500 and 800 insider-trading cases per year.95 Yet, this
number represents merely a drop in the bucket of known insider-trading
cases. Undetected insider trading is likely far more pervasive than the
numbers show.
According to a study conducted by two professors at the Stern School of
Business at New York University and one professor from McGill
University, nearly a quarter of all public company deals likely involve some
kind of insider trading.96 The professors examined hundreds of transactions
from 1996 through the end of 2012 in their study, conducting perhaps the
most detailed and exhaustive study of its kind.97 Despite the alarmingly
large percentage of deals involving insider trading, the professors concluded
that the Securities and Exchange Commission litigated only “about 4.7% of

94. Insider trading is the trading of securities by one who has material nonpublic
information. See Insider Trading, Third Edition § 2.03 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.). However,
insider trading is not necessarily illegal. It may be perfectly legitimate, such as when corporate
insiders, officers, directors, and employees buy and sell stock in their own company. See United
States Securities and Exchange Commission, Fast Answers, Insider Trading
https://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm. (Jan 15, 2013). However, the insider trading referred in
this Note, (and most commonly referred to by the public) to is the illegal buying or selling of a
security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while in
possession of material, nonpublic information about the security. See United States Securities and
Exchange Commission, Fast Answers, Insider Trading https://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm.
(Jan 15, 2013). Insider trading violations may also include “tipping” such information, securities
trading by the person “tipped,” and securities trading by those who misappropriate such
information. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Fast Answers, Insider Trading
https://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm. (Jan 15, 2013).
95. Year-by-Year
SEC
Enforcement
Statistics,
https://www.sec.gov/news/newsroom/images/enfstats.pdf (last accessed Nov. 15, 2017).
96. Patrick Augustin, Menachem Brenner, & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Informed Options
Trading prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading?, at 11, http://irrcinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/Informed-Options-Trading_June-12-20141.pdf (May, 2014).
97. See, e.g., SEC v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 1260-62 (9th Cir. 2013)
($409,638.11); SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 725 F.3d 279, 280 (2d Cir.
2013) ($38,416,500); SEC v. Boock, No. 09 Civ. 8261 (DLC), 2013 WL 4828571, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 2013) ($1,050,000); SEC v. Simone, No. 07-cv-3928 (JG), 2013 WL 4495664, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013) ($543,497); SEC v. Reynolds, No. 3:08--CV--0438--B, 2013 WL
3778830, at *7 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2013) ($10,531,225); SEC v. Graulich, No. 2:09-cv-04355
(WJM), 2013 WL 3146862, at *7 (D.N.J. June 19, 2013) ($5,592,102); SEC v. Bass, No. 1:10-CV00606 (LEK/DRH), 2012 WL 5334743, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2012) ($4,557,632).
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the 1,859 M&A deals included in [the study’s] sample.”98 It is against this
overwhelming tide that the courts must struggle in their quest to protect the
rights of the public and individual investors.99
These statistics demonstrate the significant detrimental role that insider
trading plays in the United States, and the importance of enforcement
actions. Given this data, the burden-shifting decision of First City Financial
Corp. was unsurprising and pressingly needed. However, the judges on the
D.C. Circuit did not simply rely on their personal experience adjudicating
fraud cases, nor did they simply research SEC statistics. Rather, the D.C.
Circuit anchored its decision on the reasoning from SEC v. MacDonald,
decided only six years prior.
B. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983)
In SEC v. MacDonald,100 the First Circuit affirmed the district court in
finding that the defendant violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act and Rule 10b–5 by making purchases of trust stock without
98. Patrick Augustin, Menachem Brenner, & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Informed Options
Trading prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading?, http://irrcinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/Informed-Options-Trading_June-12-20141.pdf(May, 2014).
99. The primary rules used by the SEC to prosecute insider trading are 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5. Insider Trading, Third Edition § 1.01 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (footnote 1.);
15 U.S.C. §78j (also known as Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) provides that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors. [Additionally,] SEC Rule 10b-5 . . . provides: It shall be
unlawful for any person . . . (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c)
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
[To prove insider trading under these two rules, the SEC must establish six
elements:] (1) Use of the requisite jurisdictional means in connection with the
violative conduct. (2) Showing a material misrepresentation or omission or other
deceptive or manipulative practice. (3) That such false or misleading statement was
‘material.’ (4) Showing that the defendant acted with intent, to wit, ‘scienter.’ (5)
Showing that the defendant’s deceptive conduct was ‘in connection with’ the
purchase or sale of the subject security.
See 1-4 Insider Trading: Liability and Compliance § 4.01.
100. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
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disclosing inside information.101 The First Circuit also affirmed the lower
court’s holding that required the defendant to disgorge profits he realized
upon reselling the stock.102 However, the First Circuit reversed the amount
of disgorgement required by the district court.103 Instead of requiring full
disgorgement of all profits realized upon the resale of the stock, the First
Circuit required the defendant to disgorge only the profits “representing the
increased value of the shares at a reasonable time after public dissemination
of the information.”104 In other words, the First Circuit only required the
defendant to disgorge profits proximately connected to his illegal insider
trading.
The MacDonald case arose when the SEC brought a lawsuit against
James E. MacDonald, Jr. for violating insider trading laws, specifically the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and SEC
Rule 10b–5 promulgated thereunder in 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5.105 The SEC
alleged that MacDonald violated these laws “by making the purchases
without disclosing certain material inside information learned in his
capacity as chairman of RIT’s board of trustees.”106 The district court
ordered MacDonald “to disgorge profits of $53,012 realized on the purchase
and subsequent sale of 9,600 shares of Realty Income Trust (RIT) stock.”107
RIT was a publically traded real estate investment trust that owned land
in Cincinnati, Ohio.108 RIT owned the land under the Kroger Building,
while the actual building was owned and managed by City Center
Development Company (City Center).109 Both the land and the building
were subject to a first mortgage for the benefit of Prudential Insurance
Company (Prudential).110 The lease specified that City Center would be
obligated to pay ground rent to RIT and mortgage payments to
Prudential.111 This arrangement proceeded smoothly until 1975, when City
Center defaulted on both payments.112 To avoid foreclosure, RIT advanced
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 52.
MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 48.
Id.
Id.
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the mortgage payment to Prudential and then filed suit against City Center
petitioning for reimbursement and appointment of a receiver.113 The suit
was publically announced on December 4th and subsequently settled on
December 12th.114 Though a local newspaper reported the settlement, it was
not otherwise made known to the public.115 On the same day, RIT released
its quarterly financial report, which contained substantially negative
news.116
Almost immediately after the settlement, RIT began negotiations to rent
the building to Kenner Products.117 On December 15th, a report on the
proposed terms of the lease was provided to the trustees of RIT, including
the defendant.118 On the very next day, the defendant instructed his wife to
buy shares of RIT.119 She bought 100 shares on December 16th, and the
defendant followed suit, buying 9,500 shares on December 23rd.120
On December 24th, RIT issued a press release, stating “the Trust expects
to sign a lease almost immediately . . . with a major new tenant. The lease
will bring occupancy in the building up to 95%, which would indicate a
market value of the building of approximately $8,500,000 which is
approximately $2,000,000 more than the existing first mortgage and RIT’s
investment in the property.”121 Following the press release, the price of RIT
stock shot up from $4⅝ per share to $5½ per share in two days of trading—
a rise of nineteen percent—and closed the year at $5¾ per share.122 The
defendant retained his stock until 1977 when he sold it at an average price
of over $10 per share.123
After considering the facts of the case, the First Circuit acknowledged the
general rule, established in Janigan v. Taylor,124 that a defendant should
generally be required to disgorge the entire profits realized from the sale of

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 48.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 48-49.
122. Id. at 49.
123. Id. at 49.
124. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965), approved by the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155
(1972).
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ill-gotten securities—even if such securities were sold more than a year after
illegitimate purchase—rather than be required to disgorge only an amount
representing the increased value of the shares at a reasonable time after
public dissemination of the information.125 The First Circuit found that
once it is determined that the defendant actually and fraudulently made a
profit, then the profit is “the proximate cause of the fraud, whether
foreseeable or not.”126
The First Circuit quoted Janigan, stating that, “[i]t is more appropriate to
give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the
fraudulent party keep them.”127 Thus, the First Circuit acknowledged that
under the general rule, MacDonald should be required to repay the full
amount of the ill-gotten gain. The First Circuit conceded that there were no
special circumstances in the case at bar that would affect the general rule.128
However, in MacDonald, the First Circuit noted that there are limits to the
general rule.
One such limit addressed by the First Circuit is that “where the
fraudulently obtained securities are publicly traded, and hence readily
available, the defrauded sellers can recover only those accretions occurring
up to a reasonable time after they discovered the truth.”129 The reason for
such rule is that “when a seller of publicly traded securities has learned of
previously undisclosed material facts, and decides nevertheless not to
replace the sold securities, he cannot later claim that his failure to obtain
subsequent stock appreciation was a proximate consequence of his prior
ignorance.”130
Accordingly, the First Circuit held that “[w]hen a fraudulent buyer has
reached the point of his full gain from the fraud, viz., the market price a
reasonable time after the undisclosed information has become public, any
consequence of a subsequent decision, be it to sell or to retain the stock, is . . .

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 52.
Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786.
MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53 (quoting Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965)).
Id. at 52.
MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53.
Id.
Consistent with this position, the ALI proposed Federal Securities Code (1978
Official Draft and 1981 Supp.), which is said to codify Janigan, initially limits
an insider’s liability for profits in a case like the present one to his ill-got gains,
defined as the excess over the insider’s purchase price of the “value of the
security as of the end of the reasonable period . . . after . . . the time when all
material facts . . . became generally available . . . .”
Id. at 54 (Internal Citations Omitted).
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not causally related to the fraud.”131 The First Circuit found that any
disgorgement beyond the amount by which the defendant profited from his
wrongdoing would constitute a penalty.132 Thus, there should be a cut-off date
after which the defendant’s profits are no longer proximately tied to the
wrongdoing. In accordance with this holding, the First Circuit remanded the
case to determine what length of time was reasonable to cut off liability to the
defendant.133
By limiting disgorgement to profits earned a reasonable time after the
fraud occurred, the First Circuit in SEC v. MacDonald essentially imposed a
proximate cause restraint on an award of disgorgement. If the SEC wanted
to require disgorgement, it must prove that the profits were proximately
tied to the wrong committed. As the First Circuit noted, “the defendant
could be compelled only to disgorge profits and interest wrongfully
obtained.”134
Despite the contrary holding, the D.C. Circuit in First City Financial
Corp. built on the reasoning of SEC v. MacDonald when it cited MacDonald
for the proposition that “the line between restitution and penalty is
unfortunately blurred, and the risk of uncertainty should fall on the
wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created that uncertainty.”135 The Third
Circuit would later appeal to both cases to justify its holding in SEC v. Teo
that shifted the burden of proximate cause to the defendant. In Teo, the
Third Circuit wrote the following:
In First City . . . [t]he court added that “the risk of uncertainty
should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created the
uncertainty.” In this context, First City cites to a case from the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to elaborate that the
defendant could make its case by “pointing to intervening events
from the time of the violation . . . .”
We draw two immediate points from First City and MacDonald.
First, intervening causation is not an element of the SEC’s
evidentiary burden in setting out an amount to be disgorged that
reasonably approximates illegal profits. Second, if the issue of an

131. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 54.
132. Id. at 54 (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978)).
133. Id. at 55.
134. Id. at 54 (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978)).
135. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing SEC v.
MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc)).
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intervening cause is to be raised, it will normally be the
defendant’s burden to do so.136
Even though the courts in First City Financial Corp. and MacDonald
created rules that were more conservative than the rule from Teo, those
courts still employed the same reasoning to fashion their respective
remedies. All three courts found that the risk of uncertainty should fall on
the defendant, and all three found that proving intervening causes is the
burden of the defendant. Thus, the Third Circuit in Teo determined it was
fully justified in requiring the SEC to prove only but-for cause.
IV. SEC V. TEO AND PROVING PROXIMATE CAUSE
“Understanding proximate cause is . . . like understanding your mother:
it can take years and then, just when you think you have her figured out, she
surprises you.”137 In SEC v. Teo,138 the Third Circuit extended the burdenshifting framework of First City Financial Corp. further than any of its sister
courts by eliminating the SEC’s burden to prove proximate cause. In that
case, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the
defendants were liable for violating the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, Sections 13(d) and 10(b).139 The Third Circuit also affirmed the
district court’s order to disgorge $17 million of ill-gotten profit, plus about
$14 million in prejudgment interest.140
In SEC v. Teo, the defendant, Alfred Teo, failed to comply with the
reporting requirements of Section 13(d) in order to secretly exceed the
Shareholder’s Rights Plan (commonly known as a poison pill) threshold of a
Delaware corporation called Musicland.141 Musicland’s poison pill allowed
current shareholders to purchase stock at a significantly discounted price as
soon as any group or individual reached 17.5 percent ownership in the
company.142 This poison pill device was put in place to protect against
hostile takeovers from people such as Alfred Teo.143

136. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 105–06 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
137. Peter F. Lake, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/proximate-cause (last accessed
Nov. 15, 2017).
138. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90 (3d Cir. 2014).
139. Id. at 93.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 93-94.
142. Teo, 746 F.3d at 93.
143. Id.
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Until July 1998, Teo properly disclosed his Musicland ownership interest
in accordance with Section 13(d).144 However, on July 30, 1998, Teo filed
“Amendment 7” to his Schedule 13D that alleged: “Teo ceased to have
investment powers with respect to the [MAAA] Trust.”145 Thereafter, Teo
reported his ownership in Musicland as less than 17.5 percent, but
continued to buy shares of Musicland through MAAA Trust.146 Throughout
this period, Teo filed numerous false disclosures and failed to file many
others.147 The district court found that Teo and MAAA Trust collectively
owned 17.79 percent of Musicland shares on August 2, 1998, and 35.97
percent on December 6, 2000.148 Because Teo under-reported his Musicland
holdings, he was able to keep Musicland in the dark about his ownership so
that it could not activate its poison pill.149
Nearly two years after Teo began his secret plan to build up ownership in
Musicland, Best Buy announced an “all-cash tender offer of all Musicland
shares.”150 The deal was announced in December 2000, and was finalized in
January 2001.151 During this time, Teo sold some of his shares on the open
market and the rest to Best Buy as part of the tender offer.152 Teo’s profit
from the sale of his personal Musicland stock as well as that of MAAA Trust
amounted to $21,087,345.153
In 2004, the SEC filed suit against Teo asserting violations of Sections
13(d) and 10(b).154 The district court granted summary judgment on several
rule violations that Teo did not challenge or appeal.155 At trial, the jury
found that Teo violated both Section 10(b) and 13(d).156 After trial, Teo and
the trust moved for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law.157 Both
motions were denied.158 The district court enjoined Teo and MAAA Trust
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 93-94.
Teo, 746 F.3d at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Teo, 746 F.3d at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Teo, 746 F.3d at 95.
Id.
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from future violations of securities law and held that Teo and the Trust
were jointly and severally liable for paying the civil penalty and for
disgorgement of the ill-gotten profits.159
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed each of the district court’s other
findings before turning to the disgorgement issue.160 The defendant did not
appeal the calculation of the disgorgement, but rather that the SEC was
granted disgorgement at all.161 He argued that the profits were a result of
Best Buy’s tender offer and were in no way connected to the violations of
Section 13(d) and 10(b).162 Rather, he contended that the tender offer was
the proximate cause of the profits.163 Thus, the district court was in error
when it ignored the tender offer.164
The defendant further argued that “the District Court should have
required the SEC to demonstrate that disgorged profits ‘proceed directly
and proximately from the violation claimed and [are] not . . . attributable to
some supervening cause.’”165 In making this argument, the defendant relied
on Wellman v. Dickinson,166 wherein the Second Circuit held that “[s]ince
class plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their alleged injury was directly
caused by the Section 13(d) violation, the district court properly denied
their claims for damages against Dickinson.”167
The Third Circuit noted the elements for a private action included the
element of proximate cause,168 but distinguished Wellman by the nature of
the action—private rather than public.169 The Third Circuit explained the
objectives of an SEC action are different from those of a private action.170
The SEC’s objectives are to “deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment
159. Id.
160. Id. at 95-98, 100-01.
161. Teo, 746 F.3d at 101.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Teo, 746 F.3d at 101 (internal quotations omitted).
166. Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.1982).
167. Id. at 368.
168. “In order to establish a claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant i) made misstatements or omissions; ii) of material fact; iii) with scienter; iv) in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities; v) upon which the plaintiff relied; and vi) that
reliance proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.” In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d
1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Mfr. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20 (2d
Cir. 1986).
169. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 101 (3d Cir. 2014).
170. Id.
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and to deter others from violating securities laws.”171 The goal of
disgorgement is “not to compensate for losses but to deprive the wrongdoer
of his ill-gotten gain.”172 The SEC initiates suits to “promote economic and
social policies . . . independent of the claims of individual investors”173
rather than initiating suits to act as “a collection agency for defrauded
investors.”174
The SEC is not an injured investor, so in Section 13(d) and 10(b) actions,
it is not required to prove reliance or that any investor lost money as a
result of the violation.175 Instead, the Commission must only prove ”(1)
material misrepresentations or materially misleading omissions, (2) in the
offer or sale of securities, (3) made with scienter.”176
The Third Circuit further relied on the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution to justify its relief of the SEC’s burden of proof.177 Specifically,
Restatement § 51(5) provides that “[i]n determining net profit [for purposes
of disgorgement] the court may apply such tests of causation and
remoteness . . . as reason and fairness dictate.”178 The official comments to
the Restatement counsel against giving inordinate weight to intervening
causes:
To say that a profit is directly attributable to the underlying
wrong, or (as sometimes expressed) that the profit is the
“proximate consequence” of the wrong, does not mean that the
defendant’s wrong is the exclusive or even the predominant
source of the defendant’s profit. Indeed, because the
disgorgement remedy is usually invoked when the defendant’s
profits exceed the claimant’s provable loss, it should be possible
in almost every case to identify additional causes of the profit for
which the defendant is liable.179

171. Id. at 105 (quoting SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 455 (3d Cir. 1997)).
172. Id. at 105 (quoting SEC v. Whittemore 659 F.3d 1, 11 n.2 (D.C. Cir 2011)).
173. Id. (quoting SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993)).
174. Teo, 746 F.3d at 102 (citing George W. Dent Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law:
A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865, 930 (1983)).
175. Id. (citing SEC v. Morgan & Co., 678 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012)).
176. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 103 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing SEC v. Merchant Capital, LLC, 483
F.3d 747, 766 (11th Cir. 2007)).
177. Id. at 106.
178. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(5)) (AM. LAW INST. 2011)
(alterations in original)).
179. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(5) comment f (AM. LAW INST.
2011) (emphasis omitted)).
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This point is elaborated upon in an example.
[I]f the defendant embezzles $100 and invests the money in
shares that he later sells for $500, the $500 that the claimant
recovers is largely the result of causes independent of the wrong:
favorable market conditions and the defendant’s investment
acumen or simply luck. The determination in this easy case that
the embezzler’s profit is properly attributable to the underlying
wrong rests on a number of related judgments. The first,
evidently a matter of causation, is a finding (or a presumption)
that the defendant would not have made the investment (and
realized the profit) but for the wrong. But causation in this sense
gives only part of the answer. The conclusion that the
defendant’s profit is properly attributable to the defendant’s
wrong depends equally on an implicit judgment that the
claimant, rather than the wrongdoer, should in these
circumstances obtain the benefit of the favorable market
conditions, acumen, or luck, as the case may be. The conclusion
draws further support from another implicit judgment, that there
would be an incentive to embezzlement if the defendant were
permitted to retain the profits realized in such a transaction.180
With these justifications from policy, precedent, statute, and the
Restatement in mind, the Third Circuit found that the analytical framework
for determining a remedy in an SEC enforcement suit is different than
private suits.181 Consequently, the Third Circuit found that tort-based
proximate cause analysis is misplaced in the context of an SEC-initiated
action.182 Rather, according to the Third Circuit, the burden-shifting
approach of First City Financial Corp. is essentially only a but-for causation
test that creates a presumption of illegal profits.183 The SEC must only prove
but-for causation to assert a reasonable approximation of illegal profits.184
The Third Circuit next looked to SEC v. McDonald in order to hold that
it is the responsibility of the defendant to raise an intervening cause that
cuts off liability, rather than the burden of the SEC to disprove any

180. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
RESTITUTION § 51(5) comment f (AM. LAW INST. 2011)).
181. See id. at 107.
182. Id. at 103.
183. Id. at 105.
184. Id.
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supervening intervening cause.185 Having established such a high bar, the
Third Circuit easily found that the defendants had not rebutted the
presumption of illegality, nor sufficiently proven a supervening intervening
cause that cut off their liability.186
A. The Dissent
Judge Jordan dissented in part due to the majority’s loose interpretation
of causation.187 According to Jordan, the direct causal link between the
amount of ill-gotten gain and the amount disgorged is precisely what makes
the remedy a remedial measure rather than a punitive one.188 Jordan did not
dispute the majority’s reasoning that once the SEC could prove the
transaction was “tainted,” it would create a presumption of illegal profits
under the burden-shifting approach of First City Financial Corp.189 Jordan
acknowledged that in this case, the SEC met its initial burden; however,
Jordan argued that the defendants successfully bore the burden of proof
once it had shifted to them and successfully rebutted the presumption of
illegality by showing a supervening cause—namely the buyout by Best
Buy.190
According to Jordan, the majority improperly ignored the defendant’s
evidence that some of the profits were directly caused by the buyout, not
proximately caused by the fraud. Thus, the dissent recognized that under
First City Financial Corp., the SEC correctly showed a reasonable
approximation of the amount to be disgorged,191 but that was only a
presumption, not proof positive. The defendant ought to have the ability to
rebut the presumption and carry his burden. Jordan reasoned that the
defendant was able to correctly show that the Best Buy sale was an
intervening supervening cause that cut off liability to the defendant.192 The
majority, on the other hand, held that the mere allusion to the Best Buy sale
was not enough to carry the defendant’s burden.193

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 105-06 (3d Cir. 2014).
See id. at 109.
Id. at 110 (Jordan, J. dissenting).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 112 (3d Cir. 2014) (Jordan, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 113.
Id.
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V. CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The First Circuit
In contrast to the Third Circuit, other circuits have implicitly required
the SEC to prove proximate cause rather than merely proving but-for cause.
The First Circuit followed its precedent set by MacDonald in a recent 2004
decision, SEC v. Happ,194 which emphasized the importance of proving
proximate cause in order to estimate a reasonable measure of profits
connected to wrongdoing. The defendant in Happ argued that the amount
of disgorgement required by the district court was not causally connected to
his violation because he did not know the exact contents of the insider
information he traded on.195 However, the First Circuit found that the
defendant’s knowledge that the inside information was generally bad news
was enough for the SEC to meet its burden to prove a causal connection.196
Once the burden shifted to the defendant, “he failed to show that the
amount of ‘loss avoided’ was not a reasonable approximation.197 Happ failed
to demonstrate, for example, any ’clear break in or considerable attenuation
of the causal connection between the illegality and the ultimate
profits.’”198 By reasoning that the defendant could only meet his burden if
he demonstrated an intervening cause that cut off his liability (such as a
considerable degree of attenuation between the profits and the wrongful
action), the First Circuit implicitly recognized the need for the SEC to prove
not only actual cause, but also proximate cause.
B. The Second Circuit
Even the classic limitation of disgorgement to an equitable remedy rather
than a punitive one has been a justification in requiring proof of proximate
cause. The Second Circuit noted such relationship between cause and equity
in SEC v. Cavanagh.199 In that case, the Second Circuit found that the
amount of disgorgement cannot be more than the amount of money
acquired by wrongdoing, because disgorgement is not a punitive remedy.200
If the remedy were punitive, causation analysis would be immaterial. Equity
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2004).
See id. at 19-20.
See id. at 21-22.
Id. at 32.
Id.
SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 116-17.
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demands that the defendant only pay back the amount that he stole. If the
goal of disgorgement were to punish, the defendant would also be forced to
pay fines or punitive damages on top of the amount of ill-gotten gains.201
In the 1972 case, SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,202 the Second
Circuit applied a much more rigorous causation standard than the Third
Circuit did in SEC v. Teo. In finding that the district court had erred by
over-valuing the amount of ill-gotten profits, the Second Circuit held that
there was an insufficient casual connection between the defendants’ gain
and their misdeeds.203 Essentially, the Second Circuit reasoned that the
defendants could be ordered to return the money they stole, but not the
interest they subsequently earned using such ill-gotten gains.204 The Second
Circuit opined that to require disgorgement of the subsequent profits would
be to punish some defendants more than others simply for being better
investors.205
For example, if two thieves stole ten dollars and one spent the money on
lunch, but the other used his ten to make another ten, it would be
inequitable to require the wise investor to pay back twenty, but the foolish
investor to pay back only ten. Thus, the Second Circuit reasoned that part
of the amount of profits ordered to be disgorged by the district court was
more properly allocated to income earned on valid proceeds that were not
proximately caused by illegal actions.206 Therefore, disgorging such valid
profits would constitute a penalty rather than an equitable remedy.207
C. The Ninth Circuit
In the same way that the Second Circuit found defendants could not be
liable for money made after the fraud ran its course, the Ninth Circuit
found that defendants could not escape liability for divesting themselves of
the funds after the fraud. According to the Ninth Circuit in the 2010 case,
SEC v. Platforms Wireless Internet Corp.,208 “[t]he manner in which [the
defendant] chose to spend the illegally obtained funds has no relevance to
201. Since SEC v. Cavanagh was decided, the Supreme Court has found that disgorgement is
indeed a punitive remedy. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639 (2017) (“Disgorgement in the
securities-enforcement context is a ‘penalty.’”).
202. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d. Cir. 1972).
203. See id. at 1104.
204. See id. at 1104-05.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 1105.
207. Id. at 1104.
208. SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2010).
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the disgorgement calculation.”209 Such reasoning relies on the same
proximate cause analysis used in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.210 If
extra profits created long after the fraud were not proximately caused by the
fraud, then necessarily any money lost in the same time period was also not
proximately caused by the fraudulent activity.
In Platforms, the Ninth Circuit required a stricter finding of causation
than the bare but-for causation allowed by the Third Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit held that the SEC had successfully met its burden to prove a
reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the defendants’
misdeeds, but that the defendants were unable to meet their burden to
prove that the SEC’s approximation included anything but unjustly gained
profits.211 Thus, the Ninth Circuit still found proximate cause to be a vital
link in the SEC’s case against fraudsters, thereby adopting the causation
reasoning of the First, Second, and D.C. Circuits.
D. The Tenth Circuit
In SEC v. Maxxon, Inc.,212 the Tenth Circuit found that temporal
limitations must be imposed in order to cut off liability for defendants after
a reasonable period.213 Reasoning from the purpose of disgorgement as an
equitable remedy, the Tenth Circuit found that “some end-date
determination is certainly necessary so that the defendant is not required to
disgorge profits not ‘causally connected to the violation.’”214 The court
noted that, in SEC v. MacDonald, “disgorgement was appropriate only as to
the profits made prior to the time insider information was made public.”215
Once the information became public, the profits were not caused by the
insider information, but rather by the natural movement of the market.
The Tenth Circuit held that “so long as the end date chosen results in a
‘reasonable approximation’ of illegal profits, there is nothing wrong with
the court itself determining that date.”216 The Tenth Circuit’s reliance on
MacDonald’s causation analysis as well as its own holding in Maxxon—
which implied that a “reasonable approximation” takes into account
209.
2006)).
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 1097-98 (quoting SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assoc. 440 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir.
See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
Platform Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d at 1096-97.
SEC v. Maxxon, Inc., 465 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1179.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1179.
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temporal limitations associated with proximate cause principles—showed
that the Tenth Circuit is far from abandoning the requirement that the SEC
prove proximate cause.
E. The Third Circuit
According to the Third Circuit in SEC v. Teo, the SEC must only prove
that the defendant’s profits were actually caused by his unlawful actions.
Once that is proven, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the rest
of his profits were not proximately connected to his unlawful gains. Shifting
the burden of proximate cause to the defendant seems to be a strict rule.
Yet, it is a rule that is extremely necessary.
Insider trading undermines investor confidence in the fairness and
integrity of the securities markets. Investors are unlikely to participate in
markets where they know others have the inside track because of special
knowledge. Even the Supreme Court has noted the danger inherent in
illegal insider trading. The Court noted in United States v. O’Hagan,
The [misappropriation] theory is also well tuned to an animating
purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets
and thereby promote investor confidence . . . Although
informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets,
investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market
where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information
is unchecked by law. An investor’s informational disadvantage
vis-à-vis a misappropriator with material, nonpublic information
stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot
be overcome with research or skill.217
According to the SEC, “[f]ew practices, short of manipulation, have as
deleterious an effect on the investing public’s confidence in corporate
institutions and the securities markets as the selective disclosure of and
misuse of so called inside information, i.e., material non-public
information.”218 Due to its stance on insider trading, “the SEC has treated

217. U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1997) (citation omitted).
218. Nicholas Pellicani, No Pain, No Gain: The Criminal Absence of the Efficient Capital
Markets Theory from Insider Trader Sentencing, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 3, 1057, 1086 n.224 (2011)
(quoting In re Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10174 (May 25, 1973)).
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the detection and prosecution of insider trading violations as one of its
enforcement priorities.”219
Disgorgement of profits only works as a remedy if it serves as a deterrent.
However, if the defendant is to keep his illicit profits, then he is incentivized
to break the law. Such a rule would create a “no lose” situation for the
defendant. Even if the defendant is caught and must give up the money that
he gained illegitimately, he can still keep the money he made by putting the
illegitimate money to further use. As any first-year finance student knows,
the use of money even for a short time has value. Such a rule would provide
a de facto free loan from the victims to the defendant.
The rule from SEC v. Teo is necessary because the disgorgement
remedies employed by other circuits are not sufficient deterrents to insider
trading and other financial crimes. Under the proximate cause standard of
the other circuits, the defendant would be able to wriggle out of the
“reasonable approximation” standard by arguing that the SEC has the
burden of proving proximate cause.
For instance, suppose several defendants were to start an investment
company that received a variety of illegal inside information, but also made
plenty of legitimate investments. Suppose further that the defendants made
millions of dollars over the course of several years before they were caught.
In the damages phase of the trial, the SEC would be able to simply prove
that the defendants harvested somewhere in the range of $10 to $13 million
dollars of profit from their illegal transactions. In any of the circuits, the
burden would then shift to the defendants to prove that such an
approximation was unreasonable. The defendants would have the
opportunity to argue that they received only $9 or $10 million from illegal
tips, but that the rest were profits legitimately made from investing
decisions.
Unfortunately, this framework is severely jeopardized by the causation
requirements of most of the circuits. If the SEC sued in the First Circuit
instead of the Third, causation and damages rules would directly collide.
Instead of having to disprove the SEC’s approximation of profits in the
damages phase of trial, the defendants could show that the SEC failed to
meet its burden in proving proximate cause. In the above example, the
defendants could argue that the SEC only successfully showed that $10
million of the defendants’ profits were causally connected to the insider
trading. The onus would be on the SEC to prove that the extra money was
proximately connected to the fraud. Thus, the defendants would be able to

219. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Fast Answers, Insider Trading
https://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.html (Jan 15, 2013).
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make an end run around the burden-shifting rule of First City Financial
Corp.
However, if the SEC were to litigate the case in the Third Circuit,
causation and damages would align. In proving damages, the SEC would
only need to show a reasonable approximation of illegal gain. Similarly, in
proving causation, the SEC would only need to show a but-for causal
connection between profits and bad behavior.
Thus, in the above example, the SEC would only need to show that the
defendants engaged in illegal behavior, and, but for that illegal behavior, the
defendants would not have made the profits of $13 million. The burden
would then shift to the defendants to show that the extra $3 million dollars
was too remotely connected to the fraud to be disgorged, perhaps by
proving that the defendants engaged in several legitimate transactions with
the money after the initial illegal tip and it was these legitimate transactions
that resulted in the extra profit. The causation rule from Teo is superior to
the rule from the other circuits for two reasons: (1) it comports with the
burdens placed on defendants in proving damages and (2) the defendants
are in a much better position to prove causation than the SEC because the
defendants have greater access to their financial history than the SEC. As
the D.C. Circuit aptly stated in SEC v. First City Financial Corp.,
If exact information were obtainable at negligible cost, we would
not hesitate to impose upon the government a strict burden to
produce that data to measure the precise amount of the ill-gotten
gains. Unfortunately, we encounter imprecision and imperfect
information. Despite sophisticated econometric modelling,
predicting stock market responses to alternative variables is, as
the district court found, at best speculative. Rules for calculating
disgorgement must recognize that separating legal from illegal
profits exactly may at times be a near-impossible task.
....
Placing the burden on the defendants of rebutting the SEC’s
showing of actual profits, we recognize, may result, as it has in
the insider trader context, in actual profits becoming the typical
disgorgement measure. But the line between restitution and
penalty is unfortunately blurred, and the risk of uncertainty
should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created that
uncertainty.220

220. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231–32 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit may stand alone in requiring only proof of but-for
causation from the SEC, but it does not stand in error. Disgorgement
presents a unique proof problem because profits resulting from fraud are so
difficult to measure. The financial markets are incredibly complex and
increasingly fast-paced. Securities are bought and sold in large markets over
the phone, online, or even by computer programs. Buyers and sellers
generally do not meet in person to trade. Instead, they are separated by
geographic distances as well as a web of third parties, including issuers,
underwriters, brokers, and investors. This complex trading system often
creates a complicated web of transactions that can be nearly impossible to
untangle. Many fraudsters are masters of deception, able to launder illegal
gains with legitimate ones, hide revenue off books, or simply take the
money offshore. Determining which profits were caused by fraud and
which were not is a daunting task for prosecutors.
However, causation difficulties have traditionally been resolved in favor
of the victim rather than the defendant. For instance, in personal injury
claims courts developed the substantial factor test221 to address situations
where the traditional but-for cause test fails. Rather than allow a defendant
to escape liability because proof of causation was difficult, the courts
fashioned a new rule that placed a greater burden on the defendant.
Likewise, where proving causation in fraud cases is difficult, the onus
should fall on the defendants, rather than the victims. The Third Circuit’s
causation test accomplishes this policy by shifting the burden of proving an
intervening cause to the defendants, rather than forcing the SEC to prove
proximate cause.
Critics of Teo also argue that reducing the proximate cause burden gives
plaintiffs too much power. Relaxing the burden of proof gives plaintiffs an
extra incentive to abuse the remedy to enlarge the award for their own
personal gain, or so the argument goes. However, SEC enforcement actions
are intended to promote economic and social policies, not redress the
claims of individual shareholders. The SEC’s task is to uphold the integrity
221. The substantial factor test is used when multiple defendants act independently of one
another in such a way that the victim would have been hurt even if only one defendant had acted.
For instance, if two people start fires independently of each other that combine and burn down a
neighborhood, determining fault is impossible under but-for causation. Under but-for causation,
neither individual could be found liable because, but for his actions the neighborhood would still
have burned down. The same test would be used if two people both shot a victim wherein the
victim would have been killed by either bullet. In such situations, the court will determine if the
acts of each defendant were a “substantial factor” in causing the victim’s injury. If so, both
defendants will be liable. See e.g., Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction 430.
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of the financial markets. Thus, it is far less likely that the SEC’s
disgorgement power will be abused, since no one will be enriched by such
action.
The SEC already has greater latitude than individual litigants because of
the lack of a financial motive. One such rule that recognizes the unique role
of the SEC is the relaxed requirement of standing. When the Commission
prosecutes fraudsters, it does not have to prove reliance, or demonstrate
that any investor lost money as a result of the violation.222 The courts
instituted such a rule because they recognize that the SEC has a unique role
in policing the financial markets.223 The Commission should have the power
to deter fraudsters from violating the law and cheating investors.
Accordingly, the Third Circuit was correct in holding that the SEC need
only establish a reasonable approximation of the illegal profits that flow on
a but-for basis from the violations. The defendant must raise any question
about an intervening cause.
The Third Circuit’s rule fully comports with the underlying purpose of
disgorgement—restoration of all ill-gotten gains. While it may seem to
some observers that the Third Circuit has developed an onerous rule to
burden defendants, on further examination the rule proves to be only a
modest extension of the traditional burden-shifting framework. The Third
Circuit did not egregiously violate the rights of defendants, but rather
fashioned a rule that fully comports with the policy of the burden-shifting
framework.
Furthermore, the step is even more modest in practice. Generally, the
traditional burden-shifting approach already usually results in full
disgorgement of all the defendants’ profits.224 By relaxing the burden of
proving proximate cause, the Third Circuit did more to protect the burdenshifting framework than it did to increase the size of the SEC’s
disgorgement remedy. Finally, the rule’s harsh effect has been most recently
mitigated by the Supreme Court’s holding in Kokesh v. SEC.225 In that case,
the Court held that disgorgement constitutes a penalty, and is thus subject
to a five-year statute of limitations enacted in 28 U.S.C. § 2462.226
Accordingly, as of 2017, the SEC no longer has the power to force

222. See SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Blavin,
760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985). See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 191-92 (1963) (similar holding under the Investment Advisers Act).
223. See supra note 224.
224. See SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2010).
225. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
226. Id. at 1639.
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disgorgement of profits that were illegally gained more than five years ago.
Given restriction, as well as the other limiting factors, the holding of SEC v.
Teo is not the egregious extension of government power that it seems to be
at first blush, but rather a practical extension of a long-standing practice.

